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INTRODUCTION
Farm  policy  in the  United  States has  evolved  slowly  in the  six  decades  since the
New Deal created  most of the basic  programs  that  continue  to govern  U.S.  agriculture.
The  durability  of farm  programs  is  often  remarked  upon,  but  views  differ  about  the
implications.  The  advanced  age  of farm  programs  is  one  of the  standard  criticisms  of
farm  policy.  Critics  point out that agriculture  has  been transformed  since the  1930s, but
the  programs  have  changed  relatively  little.  They  argue  that the  original  rationales,  that
might have  been appropriate  in the  first half of the 20th Century,  no longer  apply  as we
enter the  21st Century.  Program  supporters  note  that under  the  current  farm  programs,
agriculture  has prospered and benefited  consumers  and producers  alike.  Further, program
defenders  argue that the farm programs  have been built into the very fabric  of agriculture
in  America,  and  that  it  would  be  unfair  to  change  the  rules  of the  game  now,  for  no
compelling  reason.  Finally, they  claim  that it would be deeply unwise  to take the  risk of
destroying  a successful  industry  by  undermining the  regulatory  foundations  that  govern
U.S.  agriculture.
The  discussion  of the  future  of farm  policy  is  not  an  idle  academic  exercise.
Especially  in  1995,  a  live  and  pressing  debate  is  engaging  all  with  an  interest  in
agriculture  and  many  with an  interest  in public  policy  generally.  The  1995  Farm  Bill
debate  has  raised  more  than  the usual  amount  of discussion  about the  fundamentals  of
farm  policy.
The  focus of this paper  is on  policy  that regulates  and  subsidizes  production  and
marketing  of commodities.  Topics  include  farm  income  and price  supports,  agricultural
export programs  and import barriers,  agricultural  conservation  programs  and  regulations,
and finally,  crop  insurance  and  disaster programs.
Thank  you  to  Hyunok  Lee,  Jeffrey  McDonald,  Ronald  Lord  and  participants  at  a Joint
Canada/U.S.  Workshop  on  Agricultural  Policy,  Rio Rico Arizona,  March  3, 1995  for  useful  comments,
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Whereas  the list  of topics  covered  in this  overview  is long, the list of agricultural
topics not covered  is even  longer.  Agricultural policy in general  could be defined as those
issues  under  the  purview  of  the  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture  (USDA)  or  the
Congressional  agriculture  committees,  or included  in the periodic  "Farm  Bills."  Such a
definition  would  include:  food  subsidies;  food  safety  and  plant  and  animal  health;
regulations  or subsidization of commodity  marketing and promotion;  farm and rural credit
policy;  rural  community  development;  agricultural  research,  extension  and  higher
education;  and  some  forestry  issues.  The  Food  Agriculture,  Conservation  and  Trade
(FACT) Act of 1990 included 25 separate titles that range from "Global Climate  Change"
to  "Honey."  If all policies affecting  agriculture  in a major or primary way were  included,
the  list  would be  longer yet.'
The  support  and  regulation  of  agriculture  involves  much  more  than  the  basic
commodity  programs.  But,  there  is no  doubt that these  programs  are the headline issues
and the source of much of the subsidy for U.S. agriculture.  Therefore,  I begin with these
programs  and  discuss them  in some  detail.
MAJOR COMMODITY  PROGRAMS
Key programs  for  a number  of basic  field crops  and  dairy  comprise  the  heart of
commodity  policy in the United  States.  In addition, export subsidies,  import barriers  and
land  idling are often  intimately  linked to the  direct commodity subsidy programs.  These
are  all  discussed  in  this  section  but,  the  amount  of detail  provided  is  limited,  and  the
reader  is referred  to chapters  in the "Commodity  Policy Issues"  section of Hallberg  et al.
(e.g.,  Knutson  and  Smith,  1994),  to  forthcoming  USDA,  ERS  publications,  and  to
Cooperative Extension  Service policy bulletins (1994)  for more information on the current
state  of programs.
Deficiency  Payment  Programs
Price  and income  support programs  continue to contain price  supports (loan rates)
which provide a price floor,  target  prices which determine  direct payments  to producers,
and  land  set-aside  requirements  which reduce  output  and  raise  market prices.  Since  at
least 1990,  the key government  support for feed grains  and wheat has been the deficiency
payment  program.  Price  supports,  and  the  commodity  loan programs  that are  used  to
implement  them,  are  still  on  the  books  and  still  have  some  potential  for  significant
government  outlays  and  stock accumulation.  As  a practical  matter,  however,  effective
loan rates  have remained well below market prices  in almost every  market,  almost all the
time.  Table  1 provides  basic data  related to the  deficiency  payment  programs  for major
' For a treatment of the whole array  of issues likely to be important in the  1995  farm program
debate  in the  United  States  see Hallberg,  Spitze  and  Ray,  (1994).
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crops including wheat,corn,  rice and cotton.  Note the average market prices reported  have
been  well above  the  effective  loan rates  in recent years  for wheat and  corn.
Table  1.  Program Data for Direct  Income  Support Programs
WHEAT  (Target  Price  =  $4.00/bushela)
Crop  yearb  1991/92  1992/93  1993/94  1994/95c
Average  Market  Price  ($/bu)  3.00  3.24  3.26  3.50
Effective  Loan  Rate  ($/bu)  2.04  2.21  2.45  2.58
Deficiency  Payment  ($/bu)  1.35  0.81  1.03  0.95
Effective  Base  (Mil.  Acres)  79.2  78.9  78.4  78.2
Participation  (%)  85  83  88  87
Acreage  Reduction  Prog.  (%)  15  5  0  0
0/92-Idled (% of Part.d  Base)  6  11  8  7
CORN (Target  Price  = $2.75/bushel)
Crop  yearb  1991/92  1992/93  1993/94  1994/95
Average  Market  Price  ($/bu)  2.37  2.07  2.50  2.20
Effective  Loan  Rate ($/bu)  1.62  1.72  1.72  1.89
Deficiency  Payment  ($/bu)  0.41  0.73  0.28  0.45
Effective  Base (Mil.  Acres)  82.7  82.1  81.8  81.6
Participation  (%)  77  76  81  82
Acreage  Reduction  Program  (%)  7.5  5  10  0
0/92-Idled  (% of Part.d  Base)  2  2  4  3
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RICE (Target  Price  = $10.71/cwt.)e
- - - - - -_  -- - - - - - - - -- - - - -- - - - - -- - - - -- - - - -
Crop  yearb
Average  Market  Price  ($/cwt.)
Loan  Rate ($/cwt.)
Loan  repayment  rate  ($/cwt.)
Deficiency  Payment  ($/cwt.)
Effective  Base  (mil-Acres)
Participation  (%)
Acreage  Reduction  Prog.  (%)










COTTON  (Target  Price  =  $0.729/lb.)
Crop  yearb  1991/92
Average  Market  Price  ($/lb.)  0.58
Loan Rate  ($/lb.)  0.508
Loan Repay  Rate ($/lb.)  0.472
Deficiency  Payment ($/lb.)  0.101
Effective  Base  (Mil.  Acres)  14.6
Participation  (%)  84
Acreage  Reduction  Prog.  (%)  5
50/92-Idled  (% of Part.d  Base)  5


















































Source:  Various  USDA Publications  from  ASCS  and  ERS.
Notes
"A  bushel of Wheat  is 60  pounds  a bushel of Corn  is  56 pounds.
bCrop years  are June to May for  Wheat,  September  to August  for Corn,  August to July for  Rice
and Cotton.
CData  for  1994/95  are based  on projections  and partial  information  in  some  cases.
dParticipation  Base.
eRice  information  is traditionally  presented  per hundred  weight.
fFor  Rice  a substantial  amount  of acreage  (about  50 percent  of that eligible) has  been also  idled
under  the normal  flex.  provisions.
gThe USDA  is  precluded  by  law  from  publishing  cotton price  forecasts.  Currently  cotton  prices
are  at  record  high  levels.
I--------------------  -------- -
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The  deficiency payment  programs  for  all crops were revised  in  1985  and  again in
1990.  Both sets of revisions reduced  projected  outlays from what  they would have been
under the previous program  and reduced  government regulation of production  and prices.
The  most  important  deficiency  payment  program  changes  in  1985  included:
i)  lower  effective  price  supports;
ii)  lower  target prices;
iii)  marketing  loans  for  rice  and  cotton  so  that  loan  rates  do  not  create  a price
floor;
iv)  the 0/92  option (wheat and  feed  grains) and  50/92 option (rice  and cotton) for
growers  to plant as  little  as  zero percent of base  acreage  (50  percent  for  rice
and  cotton)  and  receive  92 percent  of their  projected deficiency  payment  on
idled acreage;  and
v)  yields per acre frozen  at their  1985 levels to be used for payment  calculations.
The most important changes  in  1990 were the so-called  flexibility provisions  that reduced
the  acreage eligible  for payments  by declaring  15 percent of base  acreage not eligible for
payments,  and  declared  another  10  percent  of base  acreage  to  be  eligible  for planting
certain  other crops,  with no payment  but no  loss  of program  base.
Deficiency payment programs  are voluntary  and participation  requires  compliance
with planting restrictions  and with other rules such  as conservation.  For all programs  base
acreage  is  determined  by  a  farmers  history  of planting  the  crop.  For  wheat  and  feed
grains,  base  acreage  is  calculated  on  a  five  year  moving  average  of acres  planted  and
considered  planted  to  each crop.  Rice  and cotton  use  a three  year  moving  average  for
base calculations.  Compliance  within the  flex acreage  provisions  requires  the  grower to
plant on 75  to  100 percent of base  acreage less the ARP.  Exceptions  include the 0/85 and
50/85  (0/92  and 50/92)  programs  under  which  a farm  plants  as  little as  zero  and gets  85
percent of the  projected  deficiency  payment  for  the  crop.  (Prior  to  1994  the  farmer  got
92  percent  of the  projected  payment  hence  the  change  in  the  name  of  the  program.)
Growers  are  also allowed  to certify zero planting prior  to the  crop year and maintain  base
but  get  no  payments.  If  a  farmer  plants  more  than  the  previous  base,  their  base  can
expand;  if they  plant  (or have  "considered"  plantings)  less  than  the  previous  base,  they
lose  base.  Participation  in  the program  means  the  farmer  will be  "considered"  to  have
planted the  full base.  Therefore  to build  base or to  lose base  the  farmer  must be outside
the  program.
With the introduction of normal  flex acres  in 1990,  the maximum payment acreage
(MPA)  is calculated  as base  minus ARP acres minus normal  flex acreage.  For  example,
a farm  with  1000  acres of corn base  in a year with a 7.5 percent  ARP would have  a MPA
of 775  acres (1000  -75  - 150 =  775).  Deficiency payments  are made  on acres planted  up
to  the  MPA.
Deficiency  Payment Programs for  Feed  Grains and  Wheat
The reforms  in 1990 mean that the major effect of the deficiency payment program
for  wheat  and  feed  grains  is  simply  to  transfer  income  to  farms  with  base  in  selected
crops.  For  recent  years  only  a  small  share  of base  acreage  is required  to  be  idled  but
some  acreage  is  idled  under  the  0-92  (now  0-85)  programs  (Table  1).  Further,  most
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eligible base  continues to participate  in the programs  and relatively  little acreage is flexed
into or out of the crop  for which base  is assigned.  These facts about the recent allocation
of crop  land, together  with fixed program  yields, suggest that  the wheat and feed  grains
programs  now  have relatively  little  net effect  on the total production  or the market price
of these crops  in the United  States.
For wheat (and perhaps barley)  the conclusion that the program  has relatively little
impact  on  total  output  and market  price  is  complicated  by  the influence  of the Export
Enhancement  Program  (EEP)  which has allocated  roughly one billion dollars  per year to
export subsidy bonuses.  The federal  crop insurance  subsidies and disaster assistance have
also provided  substantial  aid  to wheat  producers  in some regions  (Coble  and Harwood,
1994).  Finally,  the  Conservation  Reserve  Program  (CRP)  has  idled  36  million  acres,
much  of which  is program  base acreage  including  more  than  10  million  acres  of wheat
base.  Each of these additional subsidy  programs  may affect the amount  of land allocated
to grain production and the domestic  market price.  These programs  are discussed in more
detail  below.
As a conceptual matter, the deficiency payment programs  can increase the incentive
to  keep  land  in  grain  production  in  the  long  run,  or  to  build  base.  Therefore,  the
programs  could  increase  the  overall  size  of the  U.S.  grain  industry,  even  if production
were  relatively  unaffected  in  the  short run.  Evidence  concerning  the flexibility  in the
current  program  suggests that  the programs  hold relatively  little land  in production  that
would  not be there without  the programs.  First, under the 0/92 program  and  flexibility
provisions  farmers  can now maintain  base  and payments,  and  reduce plantings.  About 8
percent  of wheat base  and  4  percent  of corn  base  are  idled  under  the  0/85  provisions.
These percentages  are  higher  for barley  and the  other  feed grains.  For wheat, about  2.5
to  3.5  percent  of wheat  base  is  flexed  out  (net)  to another  crop,  compared  to  5 to  6
percent of corn base flexed  out (net).  Given this flexibility, there seems to be little reason
to expect U.S.  grain production to be smaller without the programs.  The same statement
cannot  be  made  about  the  neutral  impact  of crop  insurance  and  disaster  assistance
subsidies,  particularly  in  regions  with very high loss  ratios.
If, as  we  argue,  the  feed  grains  and  wheat programs  are  primarily  direct  income
transfers,  with relatively  small allocative  impacts, then the major effects of the programs
are  on the  rental  earnings  and  the  capital value  of land  with program  base.  For wheat,
deficiency payment outlays have totalled between about $1,400  million and $2,400 million
per year  since the revision  of the  program in  1990.  In addition, another  $600  million to
$1,000  have  been  spent on  export  subsidy  bonuses  and  an  average  of several  hundred
million  dollars  per year  in  outlays on  crop  insurance  subsidies  and disaster  assistance.
Total market revenue  for the  wheat industry has  ranged  from  a low of about $6.0
billion  for the  1991/92  crop  year to  between $7.8  billion  and  $8.1  billion  in each  of the
last  three years.  Under  current  farm  legislation,  deficiency  payment outlays  have been
about  25  percent of market  revenues.  Export  subsidies  are paid  to exporters  and affect
market prices directly by increasing the price exporters  are willing to pay for wheat in the
U.S.  market.  With  a  national  average  payment  yield  of 34.4  bushels  per  acre,  and  a
projected  deficiency  payment  of about  $0.85  per  bushel,  the  program  would  generate
additional  revenue of about $30  per  eligible acre.  This  calculation indicates  the  flow of
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payments  per acre.  If the output  and market price effects  of the program  are  small then
this  revenue  impact  is also  the net effect  of the  program  on producer  total revenue.
An  appropriate  capitalization  rate  is  required  to  find  the  asset  value  of these
payments.  We use  a capitalization  rate  of about four  to  one to capitalize  farm  program
benefits.  (If this capitalization  rate is not  a universal  constant,  it is at least  a rate that is
consistent with  findings  for  several  commodity  programs  such  as dairy  and tobacco  for
which  program  risk  is  also  an  issue.)  The  implied  capital  value  of wheat payments  is
about  $120 per  acre  eligible  for payments,  or about $7.0  billion for the  58  million acres
that have received  payments  in recent  years  (the  ARP  has  been zero).  Spread  over the
total  participating  wheat  base of about  68  million acres  the  program  generated  a  capital
value of about  $100  per  acre.  Of course,  these  benefits  vary  by region  and  the costs  of
program  participation  have  not  been  included  in  the  estimates.  In  addition,  disaster
payments  and crop  insurance  benefits have added substantially to wheat industry  revenue
and these  benefits  vary  even  more  dramatically  from  year to  year  and  region to  region.
Finally, analysis reported in Alston, Gray and  Sumner (1994)  suggests that import barriers
for wheat  have  likely  provided  relatively  little benefit  to  producers.  (Also  see,  USITC,
1994,  and  Haley  1994.)
For  feed grains,  deficiency payments  have totalled  from  about $1.9  billion  in the
flood  year of 1993 to  $4.1  billion  in 1992.  Another $2,000  million  of disaster assistance
was provided  in crop  year  1993.  The  feed  grains  industry  in the United  States is four  or
five times as  large as the wheat industry  by production  (output was more than 280 million
metric  tons  in  1994),  substantially  larger  in  terms  of total  revenue  (the  1994  crop  was
worth  more  than  $24  billion)  and  larger  in  terms  of  total  acreage  (about  93  million
harvested  acres  in 1994).  The  U.S.  feed  grains  industry is dominated  by corn  production
which accounts  for about  90  percent of the  revenue  in  a normal  year.
Whereas  a single  program  covers  all the  feed  grains,  other  data are  more readily
available  and  more  meaningful  for  individual  feed  grains.  To  evaluate  the  amount  of
support provided,  we will examine  data on the corn  industry (also in Table  1).  Under the
current program, effective  base  is about 82 million acres and the participation  rate is about
82 percent which leaves  about 67 million acres of participating base and about 50 million
to 57  million acres  of payment base when the ARP ranges  from  10 percent to  zero.  Corn
deficiency  payments  are  in the  range  of  10  to  20 percent  of market  revenue.  With  an
average  projected  deficiency payment  for  corn of $0.50 per  bushel and  payment yield of
104  bushels per acre,  the  average payment  is about $52 per payment  acre  or from $40  to
$45  per  acre  of participating  base.  Multiplying the  annual  revenue  times four  (as  was
done  above for wheat) the  program  has  a capital  value  of about $160  to $180  per  acre of
participating  base  and,  for the  65 million  to 67  million  acres enrolled,  the total value of
the  corn  program  is  about  $10  billion  to  $12  billion.  All  the  caveats  listed  above  for
wheat  also apply  here,  including especially the value  of disaster program payments  in the
last decade.
67Proceedings
Deficiency  Payment  Programs for Rice  and  Cotton
The  basic  rules  for  the  commodity  programs  for  rice  and  (upland)  cotton  were
discussed  above.  However,  for these  crops marketing  loans  are  an  additional  source  of
government  payments.  Also,  the per person  payment  limits,  that apply to  all  programs
tend  to  be more  binding  on  individual  producers  of rice  and  cotton  and  therefore  have
more  effect  on the  legal arrangements  under which  farms  operate.
The  marketing  loan gains  for rice  and  cotton  growers  are the  difference  between
a USDA  calculated world price and the loan rate, or zero when this difference  is negative.
Participating  growers  are eligible  for these payments  on all acres planted and are paid  on
actual  yield, not the program  yield on which  deficiency  payments are  made.  In addition
loan repayment  rates vary weekly depending  on international  market conditions.  The loan
gain  payment is therefore  paid  out on all acres planted (within  compliance  limits) and  on
actual yield.  For  cotton,  since  1991  an additional  set of "User Certificate"  payments  are
made  that are  also based  on  U.S.  domestic  and  international prices.
As Table  1 shows,  the recent rice  and cotton programs  have required  low levels of
land idling under the ARP.  For rice we have observed relatively  little normal flex acreage
planted to rice and a relatively large enrollment  in the  50/85 program,  especially in Texas,
and  in California  during the drought  years.  This  indicates  that,  in  some places at least,
rice  is not profitable  at the margin.  Furthermore,  some  growers  are  willing to produce
at  or near  the  compliance  minimum  in  exchange  for  a  deficiency payment  plus market
returns  and  marketing  loan  gains,  but do  not  plant rice  when  no  deficiency  payment  is
earned.
The  low  ARP,  low  percentage  of  rice  on  normal  flex  acres,  and  high  50/85
participation  are  all  indications that the  current  program  does not  limit rice  output from
above  for  many growers.  If the  current  commodity program  were  lifted  some decrease
in  domestic  production  of  rice  would  occur  along  with  corresponding  increases  in
domestic  price.  For  cotton  the  current  program  likely  has  relatively  little  impact  on
acreage-a result similar to that for wheat  and feed grains.  However,  unlike other  crops,
cotton  price  exceeded  the  target  price  during  1995  and,  if this  price  continues,  no
payments  would be forthcoming.
Price  Supports for Soybeans  and Other Oilseeds
Soybeans  and  other  oilseed  crops  are  supported  only  by  a  loan  program.  The
national  average loan  rate for  soybeans  is currently  $4.92 per bushel.  For  1991  to  1993
the national average  loan rate was  $5.02 and there  was a loan origination fee  of $0.10 per
bushel.  For  oilseeds  (and  for wheat  and  feed  grains)  the  loan rates  vary weekly  and  by
county.  They  generally  remain  well  below  local  market  prices  and  provide  only  some
relatively  low  cost  short term  credit.  The  loan repayment  rates  also  vary  by week  and
locale,  and  have  remained  at the  loan rate plus  interest  and  carrying  costs.
Other  oilseed  crops,  such  as  sunflower  seed,  safflower,  mustard  seed,  canola,
rapeseed  and  flaxseed  all  have  loan  rates  that  average  $8.70  per  hundredweight  with
similar provisions  as for soybeans.  These are all relatively minor crops.  Sunflower  is the
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most  important  after  soybeans  and  had  a  farm  value  of about  $340  million  in  1993/94
compared  to  a farm  value  of soybeans  of about  $11.6  billion  in  1993.
It  is generally  noted that the  deficiency  payment programs  aid soybeans  and other
oilseed industries  because  these  crops are  often  grown  in rotation  or at least in the  same
regions  as the crops which are eligible  for direct payments.  The logic is therefore  that the
planting  requirements  of the  deficiency  payment  programs  reduce the  total  plantings  of
oilseeds.  This  effect  is  less  important,  now that  flexibility  provisions  allow  acreage  to
shift on the  margin.  For example,  between  4.5 million  and 6.0 million acres have  flexed
from  program  crop  base  into  soybeans  in recent  years.
The  soybean  industry  also receives  some  protection  from  a binding  import tariff
on vegetable  oil  which has  been approximately  22.5 percent  and  is scheduled  under  the
Uruguay  Round agreement  to  decline  by  15  percent  gradually  over the  next  six years.
Import Barriers, Price Support and Allotments  for  Sugar
The  U.S.  sugar  program  has  long  engendered  strong  support  from  the  industry,
strong disapproval  from  economists  and  controversy  in domestic  and international  policy
circles.  The program  details are complex and have changed  several times in recent years,
but the basics  of the program  are  simple.  The  domestic  price is well  above the  price of
most internationally  traded  sugar and is insulated from imports  by a tariff-rate  quota with
a high  duty  applied  to  imports  above  a certain  quantity.  Currently  domestic  marketing
allotments  (along with the import barrier) keep the domestic price above the price support.
Overall,  subsidy  for  the industry  derives  mainly  from the  import barrier.  The  domestic
market price is usually about double the price of sugar on the  international market-about
22  cents per  pound for domestic  sugar  compared  to about  10 to  14  cents per  pound  for
imported  sugar.
The  Uruguay  Round agreement  led to  a change  in the  tariff-rate  quota  for  sugar.
It  fixed  the  quantity  for  import  at  not  less  than  1.136  million  metric  tons  (about  15
percent of U.S.  domestic  use) and raised the second tier GATT-bound  duty from  16 cents
per pound  to  about  17.6  cents  per pound  in  1995.  This duty will  decline by  15  percent
by  the year  2000.
U.S.  sugar  policy  has  long  been  seen  as  an example  of a  trade  distorting  policy
with  substantial  costs  to  consumers  (Johnson,  1974).  The  Uruguay  Round  agreement
failed  to  cause  any  significant  reduction  in  the  program  costs  borne  by  domestic
consumers,  at  least  in  the  short  run.  Nor  did  it  reduce  the  excess  resource  cost  of
producing  sugar  in the  United  States when  it could be  imported  at roughly half the  cost.
A larger tariff-rate  quota would reduce economic  costs of the program.  For example,  the
benefit of an  expanded  quantity  of low-tariff  imports  of,  say,  0.5  million  tons  of sugar,
would be  a direct  gain  of about  $100  million  to  consumers.  The  losses to  growers  and
those who own sugar  producing land or other resources  would be  less than these gains to
consumers,  because  much  of  this  sugar  is  produced  at  high  cost  on  land  that  is
environmentally  fragile  or better  suited to other  uses (Hafi,  et al.,  1994).
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The  1990  FACT  act  complicated  the  sugar  program  by  adding  authority  for
marketing  allotments whenever projected U.S. production and consumption (at the support
price)  are  such  that  imports  would  have  fallen  below  1.136  million  metric  tons.
Marketing  of domestic  sugar  is restricted  so that imports  are  at the  1.136 million  metric
ton minimum.  The  domestic  price remains  approximately  equal  to the support price,  so
that loan forfeitures  do not occur.  In that way,  U.S.  sugar policy was made more  similar
to U.S. peanut policy and policies in Canada for supply managed commodities.  For cane
sugar,  allotments  are  redistributed  to other  firms  by USDA if any  processor  cannot meet
its  allotments.  For beet  sugar,  annual  allotments  may be  sold  to another  processor.  In
1993,  allotments  were  sold  for about one cent per pound by a  processor  in California  to
beet processors  in  the  Midwest.
Import Barriers, Price Support and Marketing Quotas  for Peanuts
The peanut program  has  long had  an import  barrier to  insulate  the U.S.  domestic
market  from  imports,  a price support  at about double  the  price of internationally  traded
peanuts,  and  domestic  marketing  quotas  to  keep  the  U.S.  market  price  above  the  price
support.  Unlike the case  of sugar,  the United  States  is a  low-cost high-quality  producer
of peanuts  and  exports  non-quota  peanuts  into  the world  market.  The  Uruguay  Round
agreement  caused  several  changes  in the peanut program  but  it did not  change  the  level
of protection,  the  degree of support  for the  industry  or the  cost to  domestic  consumers
(Rucker,  Thurman  and Borges,  1994).
The following changes  in peanut policy were introduced  as a part of the agreement:
i)  The  peanut import  quota became  a tariff rate quota with the over-quota  duty
set  at more  than  150 percent for  each relevant  tariff line.
ii)  The  import  quantity  was  increased  from  about  zero  to  three  percent  of
domestic  consumption.
iii)  The  quantity  of  manufactured  peanut  products  was  reduced  to  offset  the
increase  in imports  of peanuts  themselves.
The  result  is no  net trade  impacts  on the  domestic  industry.
Peanut marketing  quotas  have been  in place  for many  years.  They  are a valuable
asset owned by individual  growers  or land owners and are tradeable  within local areas on
an annual  basis.  Because the price of quota peanuts  is double the price of peanuts without
quota,  the  value  of quota is about equal  to the  value  of the peanuts  themselves.
Peanut  and  sugar  producers  receive  little  support  from  taxpayers  and  this  has
insulated  them  from  the  federal  budget  pressure  facing  other  commodity  programs.
However,  these  programs  are  known  to  cause  at  least  as much  economic  distortion  as
others  and  they  are  currently  under  pressure  politically,  because  they  involve  stifling
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Import Barriers, Price  Support and Production  Quotas  for Tobacco
Tobacco  policy  has  similarities  to  peanuts  and  sugar.  However,  the  differences
are even more important.  Tobacco operated without significant import barriers  until 1994
and  the  domestic  content  rule  introduced  then  is  now  being  revised  to  eliminate  any
sizable trade impact.  Production  quotas raise the market price and exports  are maintained
because  of the unique  quality of U.S.  leaf  The  United  States remains  a major  importer
and  exporter  of tobacco.
Tobacco  production  quota  is  marketable  within  local  areas.  The rental  rate  for
quota  averages  roughly  25  percent  of the  price  of tobacco,  and  varies  inversely  with
production  costs (Rucker,  Thurman  and Sumner,  1995).  The Uruguay  Round  agreement
had little impact on tobacco policy in the United States  and controversy over health effects
and  excise  taxes are  the  major issues  for  the  industry.  In  order to  insulate it from  these
controversies,  the tobacco  program is separate  from the legislation  that is renewed  in the
periodic  farm  bill  process  and  so is  not a part of the  1995  Farm  Bill  debate.
Import Barriers, Price  Supports and Marketing Orders for Dairy
The  dairy  industry  is  large,  widespread  and  diverse.  The  value  of  total  milk
production  in the  United States  is approximately  $20  billion  per year.  The price of milk
is supported  at  $10.10  per hundredweight (cwt)  of milk by federal  government purchases
of manufactured  dairy products.  This  program  has existed  for many years  and the price
support  has been $10.10 per cwt  since  1990 after  declining  from $13.10  per cwt  in 1980.
The price of milk  is above  the  support price in  almost every market  almost  all the time,
so the  net  government  outlays  under  the  purchase  program  have  remained  below  $300
million  in  each  of the  last  four  fiscal  years.  These  outlays  amount  to  only  about  1.5
percent  of  industry  revenue  and  government  purchases  are  less  than  five  percent  of
production.
In order to reduce  outlays under the price  support and to  otherwise raise  the  price
of milk,  the  1990  farm  legislation  introduced  a milk tax (of about $0.18 per  cwt.)  to  be
paid by those farms that increased production  during the calendar  year.  This milk tax has
a variety  of perverse  impacts  on the growth  path of farms,  but the  general  effect  is to tax
efficient  farms  that  are  operated  by  younger  farmers  in  growing  markets  in  order  to
benefit the  inefficient  and  old ex-farmers  in  stagnant  markets.  The  idea of the tax was
to  reduce  the  net  budget  costs  of the  price  support.  Tax  exemption  for  stagnant  or
shrinking  farms  is based  on the silly notion that the  problem  of budget cost is caused  by
farms that are  growing rather than by  farms that are not shrinking  fast enough  or by high
cost  farms that  are  remaining  in business.
Outlays  on  the  price  support  programs  are  minimized  by  the  import  barriers  for
dairy products.  Prior to the Uruguay  Round agreement  dairy import barriers  were mainly
quotas  authorized  under  Section  22  of  the  Agriculture  Adjustment  Act  of  1933  (as
amended).  These  have been converted  to  tariff-rate  quotas with very high tariffs  for the
over-quota  and  some slight expansion  of import access  in those cases where the  previous
import quota was below  three percent  of domestic  consumption.  Tariff rates  are  likely
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to be prohibitive  throughout the  six year implementation  period  and  quantities  subject to
low tariffs  remain  relatively  small.  Remaining  import  barriers  for manufactured  dairy
products  will  keep  domestic  prices  well above  those of potential  imports.
Most  of the U.S.  domestic  dairy  industry  could compete  on  international  markets
with  no  subsidies,  but  the  combination  of domestic  price  policy,  import  barriers,  and
export  subsidies  make  the  U.S.  prices  much higher  than international  market  prices  for
manufactured  dairy products.  There  are regions  of the world,  such as New Zealand  and
parts of Australia,  that can produce tradeable  dairy products  at lower cost than anywhere
in  the  United  States.  But,  the  production  capacity  of these  regions  is  very  limited
compared  to the  size of the world market.  Opening the U.S.  and other  domestic  markets
and  eliminating dairy  export  subsidies  would  cause  higher  international  prices  for  dairy
products,  allow U.S.  producers  to compete  in a world export  market and  allow access  to
the  United  States  for  additional  low  cost dairy  products.  Current  prices  at which  dairy
products  are traded  internationally  are about  40  percent lower than  internal  prices  in the
United  States.  But, using such  a measure  would  substantially  overestimate  the  gain  to
consumers  from opening the U.S.  market to non-subsidized imports,  because an open U.S.
market would  cause  international  dairy  prices  to increase.
The  final part of U.S.  dairy policy consists of marketing orders.  These  policies set
minimum  milk  prices  based  on  end-use  and  regional  market,  pay  producers  a  blend
(weighted average) of these prices, and restrict the movement of fluid milk across regions.
Every  major dairy  region  except  California,  which accounts  for about  15  percent of the
total, participates in the federal marketing order program.  The marketing orders, including
the  state  policy  in  California,  raise  the  average  farm  price  of milk  by  about  15  to  30,
increase  milk  output,  and  cause  a  reduction  of fluid  and  soft  product  use  relative  to
manufactured,  storable  product  use (Sumner  and  Wolf,  1994 and Helmberger  and Chen,
1994).  Overall,  the  complex  combination  of milk policies  in the United  States  operates
at  substantial  costs  to  consumers  and provide  much smaller  benefit to  producers.
Other Regulation  and  Subsidies
Most other agricultural policies  are produced with relatively little direct government
support.  Marketing  orders  for  fruits  and  vegetables,  for  example,  have little  remaining
supply  control  and  no  direct  subsidy.  They  generally  do  almost  nothing  to  enhance
producer price.  However,  limes, juice oranges and a few other crops  have relatively  high
tariffs,  as does beef.  The U.S.  beef industry receives access to low cost grazing on federal
land  in  the  Western  States.  The  size  of the  subsidy  is  relatively  small,  at most  a  few
hundred  million dollars  for an industry with farm sales of almost $40 billion.  Imports of
beef have been limited by the Meat Import Law which now applies a tariff-rate  quota with
the over-quota tariff of 31 percent.  After adjusting for quality and shipping cost, the price
impact  of the  protection  is relatively  low,  probably  no  more  than  a  few percent  of the
price  of  beef  in  the  United  States.  Early  work  at  the  Organization  for  Economic
Cooperation and Development  (OECD)  on the beef producer  subsidy  equivalent (PSE)  is
now  acknowledged  to  have  been  flawed  and  a much  smaller  number  applies  (Sumner,
1995).
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Farm production also benefits  from irrigation water subsidies from federal  projects.
Evaluation  of that subsidy  is  complex,  given that the projects  were built many  years  ago
and  they  produce  water,  power  and  recreation  as joint products.  In  California,  where
about  half of federally  subsidized  water  is used,  the  average  subsidy  (calculated  as  the
marginal  opportunity cost minus the  price to  growers)  is about  $20 per  acre  foot.  About
8 million acre  feet of federally subsidized water is used in California,  and after adding the
subsidy for power used  for water delivery,  the total  subsidy  is about $200  million.  This
subsidy is distributed  across irrigated  crops worth about $10  billion.  It likely contributes
marginally to the California dairy industry.  The value of irrigation  water subsidy  in terms
of lower  feed  costs  (mostly  alfalfa)  may  lower  milk  production  costs  in  California  by
about $0.10  per cwt.  or one percent.  In the  Western United  States,  total irrigation  water
subsidies are  likely  to  be about  $0.5  billion per  year.
EXPORT PROGRAMS
Export  policy  in the  United  States  covers  a host of commodities  and  an  alphabet
soup  of programs  including  EEP,  DEIP,  COAP,  and SOAP,  which provide  export price
subsidies,  MPP and  FMD which provide  aid  for  export marketing,  GSM-102  and GSM-
103, which provide credit guarantees  for export sales and PL-480 which provides  food aid.
All of these programs use government resources  to aid farm exports  and have been around
in  one  form  or  another  for  decades  (see  Johnson,  1950  and  Benedict  and  Stine,  1956).
This  section reviews  a variety of programs  and draws on the  analysis in Sumner,  (1995).
Market Promotion
International  market  promotion  programs  subsidize  participation  in  trade  shows,
store displays  and similar activities.  The headline  case  is the Market Promotion  Program
(MPP)  which was renamed from the Targeted Export Assistance Program  (TEA)  in 1990.
Other,  older  but  smaller  USDA  programs,  such  as  the  Foreign  Market  Development
(FMD) program,  also have provided promotion  funding and assistance  for food and other
agricultural  exports.  The  MPP  was  originally  funded  at  $200  million  per  year  (the
authorized  maximum).  After being cut  in  each of the  previous two  years  as well,  MPP
funding was  reduced  further  to  $85.5  million  in  1995.
MPP  funds are  used for a variety of activities such as advertising of branded  goods
by large  multinational  firms  and  generic promotions  by  industry  organizations.  A large
share  of the  funds  are used to promote  fruits,  vegetables,  tree  nuts and  other high value-
per-unit  and value-added products.  It is  sometimes  argued that  some unspecified  barrier
or  market  failure  causes  firms  to  under-spend  on  advertising  overseas  and  therefore  a
subsidy is warranted.  A second argument focuses  on generic products  for which no single
firm would have the incentive  to  undertake promotion  and therefore a subsidy  is required
to  encourage  export  sales.  Even  if such  promotion  were  profitable  for  the  industry,
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however, this argument suggests  funding by an industry consortium  and not by the general
taxpayer.
The  Foreign Agriculture  Service  of the USDA has attempted  to provide empirical
evidence  to  support  the  payoff  to  market  promotion  funds.  These  efforts  indicate
amazingly  high returns  to promotion,  but this work  suffers  from  methodological  defects
that  render  the  results  unconvincing  (Dwyer,  1994).  The  major  problem  with  such
empirical estimates  is the difficulty of isolating in the time series the effects  of promotion
from the  myriad  of other  factors  that  affect  sales.
Export Credit Subsidies
The Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM- 102) provides backing for commercial
loans to importers  for terms of up to 3 years.  The  Intermediate  Export Credit Guarantee
Program (GSM-103)  is similar, but allows loans of between 3 years and  10 years.  GSM-
102  provides  guarantees  for  about  $5  billion  of credit  per year  and  GSM-103  has  an
authorized  limit  of $1  billion  per  year.  In  recent  years,  about  10  percent  of all  U.S
agricultural  exports  have  been  shipped  under  these  credit  programs.  About  20  to  30
percent of grain and oilseed exports have been financed with credit guarantees,  while less
than  10 percent  of exports  of other  commodities  have used  these programs.
The Department  of Agriculture determines eligible countries based on assessments
of credit  worthiness  and potential benefits.  Participating  buyers  obtain credit  from U.S.
commercial  banks or other financial  institutions and the export shipper receives cash upon
shipment.  If the foreign buyer  fails to  repay  its loan  on schedule,  the U.S.  Department
of Agriculture  repays  the U.S.  financial  institution  and  attempts  to collect the repayment
directly  from  the foreign  buyer.
As  with  export  promotion  subsidies,  credit  programs  that  meet  some  basic
international  criteria  are  not subject  to Uruguay  Round  GATT disciplines.  Nonetheless,
export credit programs  are similar to  explicit price subsidies  in several  ways,  such as the
effects  on the  quantity of exports,  market  prices,  and  the  net  government  farm  subsidy
outlays (Vercammen  and Barichello,  1994).  In addition,  credit subsidies,  as implemented
by the United States  and other major export competitors,  are targeted to particular buyers
and therefore  have the potential to  facilitate  price discrimination.  Unlike explicit  price
subsidies,  with credit  guarantees,  the  amount  of subsidy  provided  may  not be evident.
The  amount  of  implicit  export  subsidy  included  in  credit  guarantees  may  be
assessed  in several  ways.  One  way is to use the  budget costs associated  with the  credit
guarantee.  For example, for fiscal year  1993 the budget cost originally assigned to credit
programs  was  $158.5  million  or 2.78 percent  of the program  level of $5.7 billion.  The
1993  rate has  been revised to  13.2 percent based on the subsequent  experiences.  A larger
program  level  or  a more  risky portfolio  of loans  each  implies  a  larger  expected  budget
cost.  Currently  the  executive  branch  uses an ex ante  rate of about seven percent and  the
Congressional  Budget  Office  uses  an  anticipated  loss  ratio  of  about  12  percent  for
agricultural  credit  guarantees.
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In  1993,  the average  explicit  export price subsidy  was approximately  $40  per ton
for  wheat-approximately  25  percent  of the  export  price  of wheat.  Thus  the  credit
guarantee  represents  an implicit  subsidy  that is about one  quarter  to  one  half as large  as
the  explicit price subsidy and  applies to  a smaller  percent of the wheat crop.  Of course,
seven percent of the  export price  is not a fully  accurate measure of the effect of the credit
guarantees  on the quantity or value  of exports.  Some countries that makes use of export
credit guarantees  may place a high value on  a subsidy  in this  form.  Alternatively,  when
a credit guarantee  is available,  a country  may use it even though  its risk  of default  is low
and it could have access  to commercial  credit  at only slightly higher  rates.  The  value to
the  importer  may  be larger  or smaller  than  the  expected cost  to the U.S.  treasury.
In  some  limited  cases,  government  backed  credit  guarantees  could  add  to  the
efficiency  of  international  market  transactions.  Export  buyers  are  often  foreign
governments  that may be heavily  influenced  by  the participation  of the U.S  government
to  repay  loans  for  which  they  might  not  otherwise  qualify.  Some  U.  S.  government
participation  in the  credit  process therefore  may  be  useful.  However,  this participation
could  take  the  form  of a  commitment  to  help  enforce  contracts  rather  than  a  financial
commitment  to repay  the  loans.
Explicit Export Price  Subsidies
The  Export  Enhancement  Program  (EEP)  subsidizes  several  commodities  but
focuses  80  percent of its aid on wheat.  It began operation  in  1985 and  was subsequently
authorized  under  the  1985  Farm  Security  Act.  (See  Ackerman  and  Smith,  1990,  and
Gardner,  1994.)  The  Dairy  Export Incentive  Program  (DEIP),  the Sunflowerseed  Oil
Assistance  Program  (SOAP)  and  the  Cottonseed  Oil  Assistance  Program  (COAP)  also
began  in the  later  half of the  1980s.  The  importance  of export  subsidies  varies  widely
even among  the commodities  to which they have  been applied.  For example,  only a tiny
share of rice, beef or pork exports  are made under EEP, but recently almost all barley and
more  than  half of all  egg,  vegetable  oil  and  wheat  exports  have been  made  under  the
applicable  export  subsidy  programs.
Export  subsidy  program  characteristics  include  the  following.
i)  The subsidies are targeted  (for example,  the subsidies have not been provided
to Japan,  Korea,  Taiwan,  the  EU,  or much of Latin  America).
ii)  They  are now  provided  in  cash to  the  U.S.  export  firms.
iii)  The EEP  process requires  that national markets  be judged eligible  to receive
an allocation  before potential  subsidies can  be discussed.
iv)  Export firms  deal with export buyers directly to determine  the export subsidy
required  to  complete  a  sale.  Per  unit  subsidies  are  supposed  to  be  the
minimum  necessary  for  the  given  transaction.
Programs  that apply  direct export  price subsidies  (including  the  EEP  and  similar
programs)  are  subject  to the  Uruguay  Round agreement  disciplines  on  export  subsidies.
For each commodity,  subsidized export quantities  in year  2000 must be  21  percent below
the  average  during  the  1986  to  1990  base  period.  In  addition,  the  value  of export
subsidies  must  be  reduced  by  36  percent  compared  to  the  base  period  values  for  each
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commodity.  The  schedule  of reductions  requires  that  export  subsidies  be  cut  in  equal
instalments  from  either the  1986-90  base or  from the  1991  levels if export  subsidies in
that year were higher than they were in the base period.  The U.S.  commitments  are noted
in Table  2  for each  commodity.2
Table 2.  U.S.  Uruguay Round Agreement Commitments  Regarding Export Subsidies
Commodity  Annual  Quantity  Annual  Outlay
($1,000)
1995  2000  1995  2000
Wheat  (and  Flour)  20,238,000  14,522,00  765,490  363,815
Coarse  Grains  1,906,000  1,561,000  67,735  46,118
Rice  272,000  39,000  15,706  2,369
Vegetable  Oil  587,538  141,299  52,960  14,083
Butter & B.  Oil  42,989  21,097  44,793  30,497
Skim  Milk Powder  108,227  68,201  121,119  82,464
Cheese  3,829  3,030  5,340  3,636
Other  Milk  12,456  34  14,374  21
Beef  21,486  17,589  33,520  22,822
Pork  483  395  730  497
Poultry  34,196  27,994  21,377  14,555
Eggs  30,262  6,920  7,588  1,604
Source:  USDA,  FAS,  "Gatt/Uruguay  Round  Fact  Sheets"  February  1994.
Export price  subsidies have  been  the  subject of a vigorous  academic  and political
debate  in recent  years.  (See  for  example  Alston,  Carter,  and  Smith,  1993.)  Almost  all
of the  analyses have focused  on the EEP and especially the effects of the EEP for wheat.
The export subsidies for other commodities  are similar and many of the conceptual  issues
apply  to them.  Any  evaluation  of a complex  commodity policy such as the EEP hinges
2  See  the  summary  of  the  agriculture  agreement  in  IATRC  (1994)  for  more  details  and
analysis.
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on what  other  policies  and  market  conditions  are  expected  to  hold independently  of the
policy evaluated.  In particular,  in the case of the EEP,  one must  decide how  the income
and price  support  programs  respond  to EEP  operation.
Several conceptual  arguments  have offered support for the idea that targeted export
subsidy programs  may  increase national income.  The first relates to terms-of-trade  gains
in the  non-subsidized  export  market.  An export  subsidy  to  only  part of the  market can
be  used  to  raise  overall  quantity  demanded  and  to  raise  the  export  price  in  the  non-
subsidized  part of the  market.  Then,  the  additional profits  from  this higher price  offset
some  of the  costs of the  original  subsidy.
The  terms-of-trade  benefit  of the  targeted  export  subsidy  may  be  indicated  by
comparing  the export subsidy cost to the  added export revenues  from  the non-subsidized
market.  With  plausible  supply  and  demand  elasticities  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  total
revenue  in the  non-subsidized  market could rise by  any more  than $200  million (at most
$15  per ton  on  at most  13  million tons)  compared  to  EEP  outlays  of more  than  $1,200
million  in  1994  (Sumner,  1995).  Excess  outlays  on  the  EEP  are  surely  larger  than
revenue  gains  in  the  non-subsidized  export  market.  Thus,  the  terms-of-trade  gains  are
positive,  but  limited.
The  second conceptual  argument relates to the ability of export subsidies to reduce
the total budget  cost of all program  subsidies principally  by reducing the budget costs of
direct  payment  programs.  For  example,  by shifting  out total demand,  a targeted  export
subsidy  raises the  domestic  price to producers.  When this price  is also used to  calculate
the domestic  farm program payments, part of the potential  gain to producers is transferred
back to  taxpayers  in the  form  of lower  outlays for  the  domestic  subsidy.  In theory,  the
domestic  price effect  could be large  enough that  the  savings  in domestic  program  costs
more than  offset  the expenditures  on the  export  subsidies.
Government  budget costs of farm programs  are a particular interest  for two reasons.
First,  the  total  outlays  available  for  farm  subsidies  may  be  limited.  Therefore,  if a
combination  of programs  can  achieve  a  given  farmer  benefit,  with  the  same  or lower
government  outlays,  it may be preferred  by  farmers.  Second,  taxation itself has  costs to
the economy.  If the  outlay of tax money  can be reduced  for the same  income  transfer to
farmers,  the  overall  national  economic  well-being  may  be increased.  Estimates  of the
deadweight  costs of taxation  (the  excess burden)  vary  widely, but  these  costs  are  likely
in  the  range  of  10 percent  to  30  percent.  (Alston  and  Hurd,  1990  discuss  the  issue  in
terms of farm programs.)  Recognizing the  deadweight cost of taxation,  it is  theoretically
possible  that a targeted export subsidy could be devised that would benefit the whole U.S.
economy by reducing deficiency payments  by more than the total value of export bonuses.
Unfortunately,  such  a program  does not seem  likely under realistic  market and  program
parameters.  Sumner  (1995)  provides  some  sample  calculations  that  show how  unlikely
it is  for the  EEP program  to  reduce total  outlays.
A third conceptual  argument for export subsidies relates to mitigating the economic
resource  cost  of the  domestic  farm  payment  scheme  rather  than  the  budget  costs.  In
particular,  the  amount  of land  required  to  be  idled  under  the  farm  program  may  be
reduced  in response to an increase  in demand caused  by the export subsidy.  In that case,Proceedings
the  national welfare  losses  associated  with land idling  are  smaller and  this improvement
may  offset  some of the economic  cost of the  export subsidy.3
The  Office  of Management  and the  Budget  (OMB)  has  assumed  that  the  budget
costs of the EEP program were generally offset by lower deficiency payments  because the
farm  price  of wheat  rises  with  the  EEP.  However,  the  Congressional  Budget  Office
(CBO)  has  assumed  that  the  acreage  reduction  programs  are  relaxed  to  accommodate
increased export subsidies so that market price is constant and total budget costs rise when
the  EEP increases.  If the  acreage  planted under  the  wheat  program  increases  when the
export subsidy program expands  export sales, the quantity produced may rise enough that
the  market price  does  not change.  With  a  constant  domestic  price,  there  are  no budget
savings  in the  domestic  farm  program  to  offset  export  subsidy  costs  and,  in  fact,  farm
program  payments increase  because the production  eligible for payments increases  as the
ARP  is  reduced.  There  are  also  no  terms-of-trade  gains  in the  non-subsidized  export
market.
When the price does not rise with more subsidized  exports,  U.S. consumers  do not
face  higher  prices,  and  farmers  gain  from  a  lower  requirement  to  idle  land  and  from
additional direct government payments  that are made on about two-thirds of the increased
production.  The national economy benefits  when idled land is returned to production,  but
it  loses when subsidies  are paid to foreigners  and when higher taxes  or increased  deficits
are used  to finance  export subsidies  and  additional  deficiency payments  to  farmers.
A few calculations  will suggest the order of magnitude  of the  loss from  more land
idling.  Assume,  for  example  that  if the  EEP  were  removed  the  United  States  would
export about  1/3  less or about  10 million bushels  less.  This assumes that the additionality
of the  EEP  has  been  about  50  percent  on the  tonnage  subsidized-a  figure  that  is  well
above the proportion  found  in empirical  analysis.  Reduced production  of 10 million tons
would  mean  lower  acreage  by  about  10  million  acres  (using an  average  yield  slightly
below the national  average).  If we take a rental  value per year of the idled wheat acreage
of $40 per  acre,  this  implies  the  value  of the  land  idled  would  be  approximately  $400
million.4
The  $400  million figure  is likely an overstatement  of the value to the economy  of
keeping  wheat  land  in  production  for  three  major  reasons.  First,  the  additionality
assumption  is extreme;  the  acreage  kept  in production  by  the EEP  is  likely  less than  10
million acres.  Second, the  10 million acres assumption means that without the EEP there
would  have  been  a  wheat  ARP  of at  least  15  percent  in  recent  years.  These  points
suggests some  lower acreage  figure to  be more plausible.  Finally,  wheat land has  some
value when  it is idled,  and this land  is expected  to be of lower than average productivity,
therefore  the $40 per acre rental value probably over-states  the value of keeping idled land
in production.
3 See  also USCBO,  1994.
4 The  $40  per  acre  figure  is  based  on  an approximation  of the national  rental  rate  of wheat
land  that would  be idled  if the  ARP was raised.
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The  forgoing  analysis has  provided  an extensive  discussion of the  export  subsidy
programs  focusing particularly  on the export enhancement program  for wheat.  The details
of the analysis would differ for analysis of export subsidies for other commodities,  but the
policy  conclusions would  not differ.  In  fact,  for  a number  of commodities  to which the
export  subsidies  are  applied  there are  no  deficiency payments  to  be offset.  Further,  for
some  commodities  almost  all  exports  are  shipped  with  subsidy,  the  United  States  is  a
relatively minor  player  in the world  market  or exports  play a minor role  in total demand
for  the  product.  For  these  commodities  it  is  very hard  to  find  any  case  under  which
export subsidies  have  even  the potential  to  increase  national  income.
There  is also an  argument  for export subsidies  as  strategic  trade policy tools.  For
example,  it is  often  argued  that  the  EEP  may  have  contributed  to the  European  Union
(EU) reform  of the Common Agricultural  Policy (CAP)  and to the reduction of EU export
subsidies through Uruguay Round commitments.  The  1990 FACT Act explicitly required
the use  of the  EEP  and  related  programs  to  counter  unfair  trade practices.  Further,  the
1990  Omnibus  Budget Reconciliation  Act tied  spending for  export programs  directly  to
progress  in  the  Uruguay  Round.  The  Act  required  spending  on  export  programs  to
increase when the Round was not successfully concluded  by June 1992.  This threat failed.
Export  subsidies now have even  less potential  to  encourage  international  reforms.
Further,  they  have  counter-productive  international  policy  consequences  that  should  be
considered.  They  almost  surely  affect  non-subsidizing  nations  who  are  generally  trade
allies of the  United  States.  Countries such  as Argentina  in wheat  trade, or New Zealand
in  dairy  product  trade,  do  not  have  the  policy  clout  that  comes  with  large  domestic
markets,  but they  do  play  significant  roles  in multilateral  negotiations.  These  countries
are  in  a  strong  position  to  emphasize  the  hypocrisy  of U.S.  agricultural  trade  policy,
particularly  if export subsidies are directed towards competing  with them for markets  that
are  otherwise  not subsidized.  Australia  has  been  vigorous  in this  way already  in  1995.
The  summary  policy  implication  from  the  analysis  presented  here  is  the
conventional  one  that  export  subsidies  are  counterproductive  as  trade  policy  for  U.S.
agriculture  (Baldwin,  1992).  Export  subsidies  may  provide  benefits  to  specific  farm
interests,  but  it is likely that larger  benefits to  recipients could  be derived  from the  same
budget  and  economic  cost  to the  U.S.  economy  by  using  direct domestic  payments.
International Food  Aid
The  United  States contributes  about $2 billion  in food  aid each year.  This amount
provides  over half of the world's supply of food aid and about 20 percent of the total U.S.
international  economic assistance.  International  food aid is authorized  under three distinct
titles of the  Food for Peace  or PL-480 program,  under Section  416 (b)  of the Agricultural
Act of 1949,  and  under  the  Food  for  Progress  Program  of the  1985  Farm  Security Act.
The  Food, Agriculture,  Conservation and Trade Act of 1990 made  substantial changes  to
these  programs.
Since  1990,  Title  I  of PL-480,  operated  by  the  USDA,  provides  mostly  aid  to
stimulate  development  and  encourage  the  expansion  of commercial  markets.  Title  II
provides  humanitarian  donations  and  other  donations  to  stimulate  economic  reforms
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through private organizations  and multilateral programs.  Title III  provides aid to the  least
developed  nations  based  on  criteria  related  to relieving  malnutrition.  These  latter  two
titles  are  administered  by  the Agency  for International  Development.  Food  aid  under
section  416 (b)  relies  on surplus  commodity  stocks.
Food  aid is not limited  by the  Uruguay Round agreement.  In fact, so  long as  it is
accepted that shipments meet food aid criteria,  the Uruguay Round agreement  encourages
food aid  as  a part  of the  effort  to assure  that the  agreement  does  not  harm  developing
countries.  A  decline  in  U.S.  food  aid  in  the  future  will  depend  on  budget  costs  not
international  agreements.
Summary  on  Export Policy
In  response  to  the  Uruguay  Round  agreement  the  United  States  Administration
pledged  to  treat  maximum  subsidy  limits  as minima  as  a part  of their  domestic  policy
agenda.  Oddly,  at  the  same  time  that  many  have  questioned  the  rationale  and
effectiveness  of  export  market  promotion  and  credit  programs,  in  the  context  of the
Uruguay  Round agreement,  spending  for these  export  programs  may  actually  increase.
The  Uruguay  Round  implementing  legislation  did  not  require  additional  export
measures.  However  the  Administration  made  public promises  to  proceed  along these
lines.  The Secretary  of Agriculture  and the  Director  of OMB jointly stated in a letter on
September  30,  1994  to  Chairmen  and  Ranking  members  of  the  House  and  Senate
Agriculture  committees  that  export  subsidies  would  be  continued  at  the  maximum
allowable  levels  for the next  six years (Espy and Rivlin,  1994).  They  further stated that
the administration would propose increasing the funding for domestic and export programs
by  $600  million  over  five  years.
THE CONSERVATION  RESERVE  AND  RELATED  PROGRAMS
Environmental  motivations  for  farm  programs  have  been with  us for  many years
now.  Sometimes  people  forget  that  the  Soil  Conservation Service  and the  Agricultural
Stabilization and Conservation Service were  traditional  farm  agencies.  The  importance
of purely environmental  regulations  on farming  and land use is a newer phenomenon,  but
these  regulations  are  outside  the scope of this paper.
Land Idling  Programs
The  Conservation  Reserve  Program  (CRP)  and  related  long-term  land  idling
schemes  that  focus on  water quality  and wetlands,  cost the government  about $2 billion
per year and idle about 37 million acres.  These programs  began  to enroll land in  10 year
contracts  in  1986  and thus acreage  enrolled  in the early years was originally  scheduled to
begin leaving the program soon.  The  current debate relates  to extending the program  and
80Sumner
changing its  focus.  Most observers  suggest that the environmental  benefits have been low
relative  to the  cost  of the  program.  However,  the  CRP  is very popular among  farmers.
Currently, budget technicalities  are  seen by some  as important  to the likely life  of
the program.  On a more  basic level, the  issue is whether  the program is cost effective  in
dealing  with  environmental  externalities  given  deficiency  payment  program  savings,
resource  costs of land idling,  and the  budget  cost  of the program  itself.
The  CRP  asked  farmers  to  offer  bids  for  long  term  leases  under  which  their
erodible  crop land would be held out of production.  The USDA accepted  the  lowest cost
rental agreements,  subject to eligibility criteria that spread the idled  land across the nation.
Later,  related  programs  used  more  sophisticated  methods  to  score  the  environmental
benefits  in  order to better choose land  to enroll.
Table  3  shows  the  distribution  of  CRP  acreage  across  major  crop  production
regions  in the  United  States.  Most  of the  land  is  in the  Great Plains  and  the Northwest.
About  11  million  acres  of land with wheat base  is in  the  CRP.  The  second  column of
Table  3 reports recent  estimates  by the  USDA of the number  of acres  likely to return  to
crop  production  as enrollment  expires  and  the third  column shows  the  percentage  of the
total  for  each region.  Overall  the  USDA results  suggest  about  63  percent  of this  crop
land, that  is now  required  to be  idled,  would  actually  return  to production.
A reasonable  revision  of the  current  program  would  idle  fewer  acres  with more
tightly specified environmental  benefits that focus on externalities associated with erosion,
water  quality  and  wetlands  rather  than  just  meeting  a  erodibility  criterion  (Thurman,
1995).  Such  a reform  may  be likely  in  1995.
Regulations  Related  to Land Use  and Other Environmental Rules
U.S.  regulations  of  land  use,  such  as  the  Endangered  Species  Act,  wetlands
restrictions  and water quality rules are pervasive  and complex.  Farmers  see these policies
and  other regulations,  such  as those related  to  farm  labor,  pesticides or animal  waste,  as
significant  burdens on their businesses.  Reducing  government  involvement  in agriculture
may  mean  reducing  the  force  of these  regulations  as  well  as  lowering  subsidies.  If
pressed,  many  farmers  would  see  it as  a positive  trade to eliminate  these  regulations  and
farm  subsidies  simultaneously.
FEDERAL  CROP INSURANCE  AND  DISASTER  AID
For more than  15  years the United  States government  had operated  two programs,
the  ad  hoc  disaster payment  program  and  multiple  peril  crop  insurance,  to  aid  farmers
with  crop  losses  resulting  from  weather  and  similar  causes.  The  passage  of the  1994
Federal Crop  Insurance  Reform  Act  in October  1994,  however,  will change  the way  the
government  responds  to  farmers'  weather-related  yield  losses.
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Despite  federal  efforts  to  make  crop  insurance  the  primary  form  of  disaster
protection,  crop insurance  participation  has been low, reaching about one-third of eligible
acreage  nationally.  At the same time, crop  insurance  losses have been high.  Indemnities
exceeded  premiums  by  more  than  50  percent  for  the  period  1981-93,  resulting  in
government  outlays  more  than  $7  billion  for this period.  Ad  hoc disaster  payments  to
farmers  also  have  been high.  For  the  same  period  (1981-1993),  uneven  and  uncertain
federal  "ad  hoc"  disaster  spending was  more  than  $11  billion.  Ever-increasing  federal
outlays  for  ad  hoc  disaster  aid  and  crop  insurance  resulted  in  budgetary  pressure  and
created a major impetus for the recent crop insurance reform  (Goodwin  and Smith,  1995).
Table  3.  Conservation  Reserve  Acreage  and
Production if CRP Ends
Acreage  Projected  to  Return  to
Projected  to
Enrolled  Return  %
Northwest  5.3  3.8  71.7
(WA,  OR, ID,  MT)
Northern  Plains  11.9  7.6  63.9
(ND,  SD,  WY, NE,  CO, KS)
Southern  Plains  5.8  3.2  55.2
(NM,  OK,  TX)
Western  Corn Belt  6.6  5.1  77.2
(MN,  WI,  IA,  MO)
Eastern  Corn Belt  2.0  1.5  75.0
(MI,  IL,  IN,  OH)
South  4.1  1.2  29.3
(KY,  WV, VA,...)
Total  35.7  22.4  62.7
Others  (not surveyed)  .6
Source:  USDA,  ERS  Agricultural  Outlook,  August  1994.
The  Reform  Act revamps  the  federal  crop insurance  program to broaden producer
participation  and  reduces  the  likelihood of future  ad hoc crop  disaster  assistance.  The
main  features  of  the  Federal  Crop  Insurance  Reform  Act  include  the  "on-budget"
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designation  of ad hoc  disaster payment spending,  a catastrophic crop  insurance plan (CAT
coverage),  the option of subsidized  "buy-up"  coverage,  linkage to certain  farm programs,
and  a  standing  disaster  assistance  program  (NAP)  for  non-insured  crops.  To  reduce
legislation,  authority  for  the  designation  of "emergency"  spending  is  repealed.  Future
outlays  for emergency  crop  losses will be  "on-budget"  rather than "off-budget,"  requiring
an offset  in spending in  other program(s).  Federal  crop  insurance  is supplemented  with
a new  Catastrophic  Coverage  Level  (CAT)  available  to  farmers  for a processing  fee  of
$50  per crop.  The  fee cap  is $200  per  farmer per  county  and  $600  per  farmer  in total.
CAT  coverage  will pay  farmers  for  crop  yield  losses  greater  than  50  percent  of their
actual production history yield (a 4-10 year simple average)  at 60 percent of the expected
market price.  Farmers  may purchase additional insurance  coverage, providing higher yield
protection  (up to 75 percent)  and/or price protection  (up to  100 percent).  Added coverage
is  subsidized  at  a higher  rate than  under the  pre-reform  program.
To  be  eligible  for  commodity  support  programs,  certain  Farmers  Home
Administration  loans,  or  CRP  contracts,  farmers  are  now  required  to  have  at  least
catastrophic  coverage  for  each  insurable  crop.  Under  the  new  rules,  crop  insurance
participation  is expected  to be high because  it is required  for producers  that receive  any
other  subsidy.  CAT  and  NAP  are  likely  provide  lower  benefits  to  farmers  than  the
benefits provided  under pre-reform  ad hoc disaster aid.  CAT now costs farmers  nominal
fees,  and to receive  payments,  farmers  must experience  yield losses greater  than the pre-
reform  level  of  40  percent.  However,  farmers  purchasing  additional  crop  insurance
coverage  will  be subsidized  at  a higher  rate.
For crops  for which insurance  is not currently  available,  the  Reform Act provides
a standing  disaster  aid program  under NAP provisions.  NAP is similar to  CAT in terms
of coverage  and eligibility requirements.  However,  NAP requires  an additional eligibility
condition-a  35  percent  area  loss  to trigger  any  individual  payments  (Lee  et  al.,  1995).
Once the area-level  threshold  is reached,  farmers  will  be paid  for  individual  crop  losses
in excess of 50 percent  at 60 percent of the price election  announced by USDA in advance
of the crop year. The  area-triggered  loss requirement of NAP will reduce significantly  the
likelihood  of an  individual  receiving  payments.
Many farmers  will likely get no payment  from the new programs  and many express
resentment  at being required  to enroll  in something worthless.  In addition, even  growers
who are willing to stipulate  that they would never receive benefits  are required to provide
accurate  and detailed  production  records  under  CAT (by  farm,  for operations  with more
than one  farm).  The  future  of the  new program,  however,  is likely to  be indicated by its
success  at forestalling  ad hoc  disaster assistance.  It is  also important  to reduce  losses of
the crop  insurance  program and reduce  the uneven crop  and  geographic pattern  of excess
loss  ratios.  Crop insurance  and  disaster  aid  programs  were  some  of the  budget-busting
failures  of the  1980s  and  1990s.  The  1994 Act reduced  the  generosity  of the programs,
but  moral  hazard  and  adverse  selection  inherent  in  crop  insurance  remain  unresolved.
Also, the  demand  for  special  disaster  aid  will still  occur when  television  news pictures
show  farms  blowing away  or under water.
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CONCLUSIONS:  THE GOVERNMENT  ROLE IN AGRICULTURE
Agricultural  subsidies  appear  in  an  impressive  and  imaginative  array  of form.
Nonetheless  these  subsidies  receive  little  support  from  economists  or  other  outside-
observers.  Despite general  skepticism about government  current  activities  most  analysis
by  economists  suggests  that there  may be  too  little  government  in  a  few  areas  of U.S.
agriculture.  The  payoff  to  more  government  activity  in  creating  and  disseminating
knowledge  has  been  established  in  many  studies.  (Wright,  1995;  Alston  and  Pardey,
1995.)  And  there  are  cogent  arguments  for  a  government  role  in  sponsoring  and
encouraging researchers.
Agricultural policy in the United  States is complex and varied.  About half of farm
output receives  relatively  little direct subsidy,  but some commodities  such as wheat,  have
export  aid,  import  protection,  subsidized  crop  insurance,  paid  land reserves,  as  well  as
direct government  payments.  Other  commodities  such as milk have import  barriers,  and
incredibly  complex  government  price regulations  that  cost  consumers  much  more than
they return to growers.  Finally, commodities  such as peanuts and sugar have only import
barriers  that alone  generate  large  rents to  owners  of land or marketing  quota.
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